-- Cellular networks are not designed to delivery emergency-scale traffic loads -- Cellular networks are not the Internet -- Targeting users in a specific location is extremely difficult -- There is no way to authenticate the source of messages, making fraudulent alerts easy to send -- SMS is not a real-time service -- Message delivery order is not always predictable"As reported by the media, we had a reasonably good demonstration of wide-scale text messaging efforts by the Obama campaign recently," Traynor stated. "However, even though the population participating in this campaign announcement was not necessarily as dense as a major disaster messaging effort, there were still significant message delivery issues reported similar to the ones described in my research paper." Traynor shows through a series of experiments, that even under optimal conditions, networks cannot meet the ten minute alert goal generally set forth by the public EAS charter. Moreover, it is further demonstrated that the extra text messaging traffic generated by third party EAS will cause congestion in the network and may potentially block the delivery of critical information, such as calls between emergency responders or the public to 9-1-1 services. The report concludes that it is critical that legislators, technologists and the general public understand the current limitations of these systems. Solutions such as the efforts undertaken by the Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee (CMSAAC) set up by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will allow cellular networks to take an active role during emergencies. The report suggests that through the creation of new standards such as Cell Broadcast, many of the problems created by the current "point to point" architecture can be avoided. In particular, by allowing each base station to act as a virtual megaphone, cellular networks will be able to rapidly distribute up to the moment emergency messages to all phones. While nearly all major cellular providers are actively working to design, test and deploy such systems, it will take time before this piece of our critical infrastructure can perform such tasks. "Characterizing the Limitations of Third-Party EAS Over Cellular Text Messaging Services" white paper, a third party academic research report, is available for free download on the 3G Americas website at www.3gamericas.org. About Patrick Traynor, Ph.D., Assistant Professor in the School of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute of Technology Patrick Traynor's research focuses primarily on security for cellular networks and the impact of connecting these systems with the larger Internet. His work on this subject has been presented in top security and mobile networking conferences and journals and has also been covered by The New York Times. Previous research reports include "On Attack Causality in Internet-Connected Cellular Networks"; "Exploiting Open Functionality in SMS Capable Cellular Networks"; "Mitigating Attacks on Open Functionality in SMS-Capable Cellular Networks"; and a Ph. D. thesis entitled, "Characterizing the Impact of Rigidity on the Security of Cellular Telecommunications Networks."
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